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Dear California Readers:
The more than 350 sheriffs, police chiefs, district attorneys and crime survivors who leadFIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS California are determined to put dangerous criminals behind bars.But we also know that no amount of punishment after the fact can undo the tragedy andagony caused by crime.
We are committed to taking a hard-nosed look at what really works to steer kids away fromcrime. Public safety requires that some young offenders be incarcerated. But this reporthighlights community and family interventions for many other young offenders and theirfamilies that are proven to cut repeat arrests by as much as half. Besides preventing repeatcrimes, these interventions will save taxpayers money.
California has begun to invest in these community-based interventions, but much more canand needs to be done to keep today’s troubled teens from becoming tomorrow’s careercriminals.
Rigorous research, years of experience, and plain common sense compel this verdict: Makinghigh-quality, intensive interventions available to more troubled youths and their families iscrucial to an effective, balanced anti-crime strategy. It is a strategy that will reduce the risk ofcrime and violence striking families across California.
We urge California policymakers to make access to proven interventions for troubled youthsa high priority.
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Each year, there are over 200,000 arrests of juveniles in California. While the majority of kids
brought before a court for the first time learn their lesson and do not come back, too many
serious offenders commit crime after crime. For example, approximately 70 percent of juveniles
leaving state custody—which is generally reserved for the most serious offenders—are re-arrested
within three years. These repeat offenders pose a significant threat to public safety.
Proven intensive family therapies for serious and chronic offenders cut repeat
arrests in half
There is now solid evidence from a growing number of rigorous studies showing that
community-based interventions keep young offenders from committing more crimes. In
particular, intensive family therapies give parents the tools they need to regain control of their
kids and steer them away from crime, while giving troubled teens the tools they need to behave
responsibly. Randomized control trials prove these programs work:
• Functional Family Therapy (FFT)—Serving repeat offenders, FFT cut re-arrests in half.
• Multisystemic Therapy (MST)—Serving other repeat offenders—some of whom were even
more troubled—MST cut re-arrests for a violent offense in half.
• Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC)—Serious offenders who had to be
removed from their homes and were placed with specially-trained families were six times
more likely to have no new arrests than boys placed in group homes.
New California research shows promising state-funded interventions also can
work before juveniles become serious or chronic offenders
In addition to intensive family therapies, California is successfully investing in early
interventions to keep troubled youth from becoming serious or chronic offenders in the first
place. According to new data:
The Repeat Offender Prevention Program (ROPP) targets young offenders who, upon their first
conviction, are identified as being at high risk of becoming repeat offenders. In Monterey County,
similar youths not served by this program were twice as likely as participating youths to be
arrested for a new crime.
Ventura County’s Early Intervention program provides assessments and treatment plans for
youths who are arrested, but not brought before a court. Compared to participants, similar youths
who were not enrolled in the program were twice as likely to be arrested again and eight times
more likely to be incarcerated.
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Executive Summary
On the Right Track to Safer Communities:
Steering California’s Juvenile Offenders
Away from Lives of Crime
Day Reporting Centers provide a range of comprehensive services for youths sentenced to
probation and/or youths transitioning from county custody back into their communities. In
Sacramento County, compared to Day Reporting Center participants, juveniles in a similar group
not receiving these services were four times more likely to have a felony arrest.
Similar youths left out of San Diego County’s Truancy Supervision Program were more than
three times as likely to be arrested as program participants.
California has begun to fund successful community-based interventions
Established in 2006, the Juvenile Mentally Ill Offender Crime Reduction (MIOCR) program
supports proven interventions such as intensive family therapies. Thirteen of the 20 counties
awarded Juvenile MIOCR grants were funded to provide FFT, MST or MTFC.
Counties use Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act (JJCPA) funding for both proven
interventions like FFT and MST, and for a variety of promising locally-designed interventions
before juveniles turn into serious or chronic offenders. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s
Administration credits JJCPA with “curbing juvenile crime”and deterring “countless thousands”of
juveniles from ending up in custody. State-collected data released in 2006 show that at-risk
youths not in JJCPA programs were 33 percent more likely to be arrested than participating
youths.
Many California juvenile offenders are still not receiving needed
interventions
Despite the success of many interventions at preventing crime, not nearly enough juveniles are
being served through these programs. For example:
Based on data released in April 2007, intensive family therapies serve just 4 percent of more
than 20,000 juvenile offenders in California who are obvious candidates for these programs
because they are either at home under intensive supervision (rather than in regular probation), in
foster care or group homes, or in aftercare following custody.
Demand for funding for juvenile interventions is high. For example, in 2006 the state rejected
over $14 million in Juvenile MIOCR applications due to lack of funding, including several
applications that would have funded proven intensive family therapies.
Despite a recent funding increase, JJCPA is still below its original funding level, while spending
for Corrections has increased 77 percent. Many valuable JJCPA programs have been forced to shut
down entirely, cut services, or place troubled youths on waiting lists.
Quality community-based interventions save lives and money
Interventions like intensive family therapies are not only relatively inexpensive compared to
state custody—which now costs approximately $175,000 per youth annually—they are also
cost-effective. For example, every dollar invested in intensive family therapies saves the public as
much as $14 and produces net savings of $18,000 to over $75,000 for each juvenile offender
served. If California provided these interventions to all eligible youths, it could save taxpayers and
crime victims over $700 million.
The more than 350 members of FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS California support investments in
proven community-based interventions that steer troubled youth away from crime. In order to
build on its successes, California needs to increase funding for the Juvenile Mentally Ill Offender
Crime Reduction program and the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act.
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Introduction
FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS California is a
bipartisan, anti-crime organization led by more
than 350 law enforcement leaders—sheriffs,
police chiefs and district attorneys—and
survivors of crime. Many of the survivors are
parents of murdered children.
Crime cannot be ignored. To keep families
and their communities safe, young offenders
committing serious or repeated crimes may
need to be placed in custody. A range of minor
to more serious sanctions may suffice for other
crimes.
Along with punishment, research shows that
troubled teens will need help to stop their
aggression, substance abuse or other anti-
social behaviors. Sanctions that include strict
and effective interventions can direct anti-
social and dangerous juveniles onto a different
path that will better protect California
communities.
The problem
Law enforcement is working hard to address
juvenile crime and make sure dangerous juve-
niles are taken off the streets—there are over
200,000 arrests of California juveniles every
year.1 The most dangerous of these young
offenders are locked up, as they should be.
The problem—one with disastrous
consequences for public safety—is that police
officers and sheriffs find themselves arresting
some of the same kids again and again, and
district attorneys are forced to prosecute the
same kids over and over. As juveniles’ criminal
records pile up and offenses get more serious,
locking them up becomes necessary to protect
public safety.
The state is also spending a lot of money. The
cost for a juvenile placed in the custody of the
state’s Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ, formerly
known as the CaliforniaYouth Authority) is
approximately $175,000 per year.2 In addition,
repeat crimes lead to massive costs in
enforcement, loss of property, and loss of life.
Who is committing most of the
crimes?
Any consideration of juvenile crime in
California must begin with the understanding
that:
• Most juveniles arrested are not likely
to become serious offenders.
Nationally, six in ten juveniles brought
before a juvenile court for the first time
will not return to court on another
charge.3
• Most juvenile crimes are committed
by relatively few juveniles, many of
whom continue committing crimes as
adults.
Approximately 70 percent of juvenile
offenders held in state custody—which is
generally reserved for the most serious
On the Right Track to Safer Communities:
Steering California’s Juvenile Offenders
Away from Lives of Crime
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offenders—are arrested again within three
years,4 which shows that more needs to
be done, as early as possible, to identify
the juveniles who are most likely to
commit more crimes and to help them
before they become enmeshed in a life of
crime.
The first-hand experience of law
enforcement and academic research confirms
that serious violence is confined to a small
minority of young people.5
A window of opportunity to steer
troubled youth back on track
Public safety requires that many of these
serious juvenile offenders be locked up. But
with the help of proven or promising
community-based interventions, others can be
steered back on track before they become such
a danger to the public that they need to be
locked up, or after they have been released
from custody. (This report generally does not
address how to reform state- or county-level
secure facilities and services for youths in those
facilities in order to reduce repeat crime.)
Most young offenders remain at home after
being arrested, providing a window of
opportunity to intervene with them and their
families before secure custody is required. Only
about one in ten juvenile arrests in California
results in placement in secure local or state
custody after the juvenile court equivalent of a
trial.6 While many juveniles are detained
temporarily in juvenile halls prior to trial,
according to a one-day snapshot released in
April 2007, only one in eight juvenile offenders
under county probation or state supervision is
in secure custody in a local juvenile hall,
“camp”or “ranch”or in the state’s facilities.7
Another window of opportunity exists when
those young offenders who wind up in custody
are released and transitioning back into their
communities. Many repeat offenders cycle in
and out of custody with regularity. The average
stay in a county camp or ranch, after all, is just
four-and-a-half months.8 It is clear that nearly
all juveniles who are locked up—even many
with serious offenses—will sooner or later
rejoin our communities. Juvenile offenders do
not disappear.
To protect our communities, California can
and should do much more to cut re-offending
by the minority of juvenile offenders who are
on the way to becoming serious or chronic
offenders.
“Most young offenders remain at
home after being arrested,
providing a window of opportunity
to intervene with them and their
families before secure custody is
required. Only about one in
ten juvenile arrests in California
results in placement in secure local
or state custody.”
Chapter 1
Preventing Crime by Intervening with
Serious and Chronic Juvenile Offenders
Before They Need to Be Locked Up
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There are times when the nature of the crime
or crimes committed simply demands that a
juvenile be sentenced to state or county
custody following trial. In other situations,
though, court-ordered sanctions that do not
include custody may actually work better to
reduce future crime. If in addition to the usual
punitive measures such as fines, community
service and curfews, a judge also orders
participation in a carefully-structured
intervention, juveniles can be taught to avoid
crime by adopting new social skills, attitudes
and beliefs.
The wisdom of using scientifically-
tested interventions
The best way to ensure that our streets will
be safer is to rely on sanctions and
interventions proven by careful, scientific
testing. The most reliable method for testing
whether an intervention really delivers results
is the same rigorous method used by medical
science to test new medicines: randomly assign
half the juveniles to receive the intervention
and the other half to receive the typical services
being delivered to delinquent juveniles. Then
carefully measure the results.
Solid evidence emerging from a growing
number of such randomized control trials
shows what works to help young offenders
avoid committing further crimes. In particular,
community-based intensive therapies for
youths and their families have had great
success in directing youths toward productive
lives instead of reckless involvement in more
crime.
An approach that works—Training
families to control their delinquent
children
Intensive family therapies give parents the
tools they will need to regain control of their
kids and steer them away from crime, while
also giving troubled teens the tools they will
need to behave responsibly. Family therapy is a
very broadly-used term that includes marriage
counseling and various other interventions. But
a more specific range of targeted intensive
family therapies has proven results with
young—usually repeat—offenders, including
those with aggression and/or substance abuse
problems.
Most troubled young people, even if they go
into custody, will return to their families.
Families play an influential role, either positive
or negative, in their children’s aggression or
substance abuse. Many parents, who may have
made many unwise decisions themselves, do
not want their children to make the same
mistakes. They may be poorly-trained,
however, in how to keep their children out of
fights and away from drugs, especially if they
live in high-crime neighborhoods.
Effective family therapy typically begins by
convincing families that change is possible. It
usually involves teaching families how to stop
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arguing with each other. Then parents are
taught how to keep better track of their
children’s behavior and set clear limits. For
teens who react positively, parents can use
positive reinforcement, such as giving their
children increased autonomy by allowing, for
example, additional unsupervised time with
positive peers. For teens who continue to
misbehave, parents learn to provide
appropriate discipline.
Once parents have been given the right
tools, the professionals help them practice until
they are getting results on their own. Others
are brought into the process, such as extended
family members, teachers, positive peers and
service providers. They can increase the
quantity and quality of positive influences in
troubled teens’ lives, and help strengthen the
parents’ ability to manage their children’s
behaviors. Together, this extended network
helps embed the juveniles in a positive
environment that keeps them away from drugs
and crime.
A number of family therapy interventions
have been repeatedly evaluated using
randomized control trials. These interventions
typically incorporate individualized cognitive
behavioral therapy—another proven approach
that teaches teens to modify their troubled
behaviors by learning and practicing alternative
ways of responding to interpersonal problems.9
The body of research shows that—when
properly implemented—high-quality intensive
family therapies can reduce repeat crimes.
Functional Family Therapy (FFT)
Functional Family Therapy (FFT) is for mod-
erate- to high-risk teens with delinquency,
aggression and/or substance abuse problems.
FFT can be used for at-risk youth and juveniles
facing probation, being considered for custody,
or returning to their families from custody. It is
delivered over a period of eight to 30 hours by
trained providers, who range in background
from para-professionals to mental health pro-
fessionals.10
FFT cut re-arrests by participants in half,
compared to a control group in one
randomized study (50 percent for control group
youths vs. 26 percent for FFT participants), and
reduced out-of-home placements by three
quarters in another study (72 percent vs. 18
percent).11
In California, FFT also has delivered
promising results. FFT participants in Sutter
County were 73 percent less likely to get
arrested after entering the program.12
Multisystemic Therapy (MST)
Similar to FFT, Multisystemic Therapy (MST)
serves moderate- to high-risk teens, though
MST often serves some teens who are more
serious or violent offenders than those served
by FFT. MST typically involves 60 hours of
professional interventions over four months.
The staff members are on call, if need be,
around the clock.13 One MST study followed
juvenile offenders and a randomized control
group until they were, on average, 29 years old.
Individuals who had not received MST were 62
percent more likely to have been arrested for
any offense (81 percent vs. 50 percent), and
more than twice as likely to have been arrested
for a violent offense (30 percent vs. 14
percent).14
Functional Family Therapy (FFT) 
Cut Re-Arrests in Half
Percent of youths re-arrested
50%
26%
Youths receiving 
no program
Youths receiving 
Functional Family 
Therapy
Blueprints for Violence Prevention, 2000
Los Angeles County’s MST program has
demonstrated positive outcomes. Similar
juveniles who did not receive MST services
were 43 percent more likely to be arrested than
MST participants.15
Out-of-home placements with
specially-trained foster families—
Multidimensional Treatment Foster
Care (MTFC)
While the intensive family therapies
mentioned above are for juvenile offenders
who can remain at home, another intensive
family therapy is proven to reduce future crime
for youths where home placement is not a
viable option. Already, on a given day, close to
4,000 juvenile offenders in California are placed
in group homes or foster care, both with
generally lower levels of security than most
county or state facilities. This compares with
the over 6,000 juvenile offenders who are
placed in county camps and ranches or in state
custody.16
An alternative for many of these young
offenders in group homes or foster homes
would be individual placement in a
Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care
(MTFC) home where they will not mix with
other delinquent juveniles. Individualized
foster care may sound like a“soft”sanction for
juvenile offenders. But for teens who are often
used to running the streets, and who may see a
month in custody as just another chance to
hang out with delinquent friends and learn
new criminal behaviors, this approach creates a
highly-controlled environment that is, in many
ways, a tougher intervention than placement in
a group home.
The MTFC foster parents are carefully chosen
and trained and usually only work with one
child at a time. When juvenile offenders come
into the foster homes, the youngsters are
initially not allowed to leave their foster
parents’ sight during waking hours. They must
earn the right to be alone those first few days.
Then they must attend school regularly,
carrying a card each day for their teachers to
sign. Teachers from every period must sign the
card, noting whether the students showed up
and behaved. Eventually, the youngsters can
earn opportunities to interact with positive
peers outside of school, but negative behaviors
quickly result in the loss of those privileges.
Meanwhile, a professional trains each teen in
the social skills needed to avoid fights or situa-
tions that can lead to further crime.
Participation of parents or guardians is still
integral to this program. While the youngsters
are living in the very controlled environment of
a foster home for six months to a year, their
parents or guardians are being trained to take
over and establish the same rules and expecta-
tions when their children return home.17
MTFC works much better than placement in
a group home. Randomized control group
research shows the MTFC approach successful-
ly cuts the average number of arrests for seri-
ously delinquent juveniles in half (5.4 arrests
for control group vs. 2.6 arrests for MTFC
youths). According to the same study, boys
placed in MTFC homes were six times more
likely to have no new arrests than boys placed
in group homes (41 percent vs. 7 percent).18
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Boys with Specially-Trained Foster Parents 
Six Times More Likely to Have 
No New Arrests
Percent of youths with no new arrests
41%
7%
Boys in group 
home
Boys in 
Multidimensional 
Treatment Foster 
Care
Blueprints for Violence Prevention, 1998
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MTFC also can be an option for juvenile
offenders re-entering their communities after
state or county custody if they do not have
stable homes to return to. At an MTFC home,
young offenders leaving custody can learn the
skills they will need to stay out of trouble as
they return to school or seek employment. And
their parents will receive the training they need
to continue this process once their children
transition fully back home.
Community-based interventions
instead of custody can work for many
offenders—Lessons from Ohio and
San Francisco
Community-based interventions have been
shown to reduce crime, not just in individual
tests of programs, but also in broader citywide
and statewide efforts.
Ohio
Evidence from a statewide effort in Ohio to
shift juvenile offenders from state custody
suggests that, while there are very high-risk
offenders who need to be locked up, public
safety often will be best served if lower-level
offenders receive community-based
interventions instead of custody.
“RECLAIM Ohio”diverted low-, moderate-,
and in some cases even high-risk juveniles, to
community sanctions with a range of
interventions (though not including proven
intensive family therapies) in place of state or
county custody. Research on RECLAIM Ohio
by Christopher Lowenkamp and Edward
Latessa showed that, if low- to moderate-risk
offenders were placed in custody and not in a
community-based intervention, they returned
to custody upon release at five to seven times
the rate of juveniles receiving interventions.20
It is important to note that Ohio’s approach
was not appropriate for the very highest-risk
offenders. The RECLAIM researchers found
that the very highest-risk juveniles—teens with
a combination of current felonies, prior felonies
and at least three referrals to the courts starting
before age 14—end up committing more crime
if not locked up in custody.21 These offenders
may need to be locked up but can still receive
other effective interventions while in custody
or after leaving custody. But for low-, medium-,
and even some high-risk offenders, RECLAIM
High-quality interventions and effective staff produce the best results
Researchers have found that the success of interventions for juvenile offenders depends on
both the design of the intervention (whether or not it is based on past scientific research and
development, which was then carefully tested) and whether or not a well-trained, experienced
staff was implementing the program. Research by Mark Lipsey and his team atVanderbilt
University of a broad number of interventions to prevent juvenile delinquency found that
interventions that were both
strongly-designed and well-
staffed had nearly twice the
impact as interventions that
were either strongly-designed
but poorly-staffed, or weakly-
designed but well-staffed. Not
surprisingly, the researchers also
found that a weak intervention
with ineffective staff does not
reduce repeat crimes any more
effectively than typical juvenile
justice interventions.19
What works (and 
doesn’t work) to 
reduce repeat 
crimes by juveniles
A poorly-trained and 
ineffective staff
No reduction in repeat 
crimes compared to 
typical services
24% reduction in 
repeat crimes
A well-trained and 
effective staff
24% reduction in 
repeat crimes
46% reduction in 
repeat crimes
A weakly-designed 
intervention
A strongly-designed 
intervention
Dennis, 2005 & Lipsey, 1997
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reduced crime more effectively by placing them
in community-based interventions instead of in
custody.
San Francisco
California has its own proof that this
approach works. San Francisco’s Detention
Diversion Advocacy Project (DDAP) serves
juvenile offenders facing secure confinement. If
DDAP officials determine that the juveniles are
not a high risk to their communities and would
show up for court, they petition the judge to
direct the juveniles instead into the DDAP
program, which provides close supervision
coupled with efforts to help the youths and
their families to avoid future crime.Youths are
directed, based on individual needs, to
community services such as tutoring, drug
counseling and family counseling. DDAP also
helps parents of offenders, if needed, to secure
employment, drug counseling, food stamps,
etc. Meanwhile, street-wise workers keep close
track of the youths and ensure they receive the
needed interventions.
A study of this program yielded impressive
results: Juveniles not receiving DDAP were
twice as likely as program participants to be
referred to juvenile court again on a new
offense.22
Risk assessments are essential
The Ohio and San Francisco results clearly
show the wisdom of taking into account a
juvenile’s risk of repeat crimes. Decisions on
where offenders will serve their sentences and
what services they need to avoid future crime
should be carefully informed by scientifically-
valid risk assessments, which consider not only
the number and nature of crimes committed,
but also each juvenile’s own personal history
and support systems. More than a dozen
California counties already are using validated
risk assessments to help identify the
appropriate interventions for juvenile
offenders, although more counties need to
move in that direction.23
Based on the experiences of Ohio and San
Francisco, it is clear that California has a
tremendous opportunity to improve public
safety by making a commitment to effective
community-based interventions.
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Ohio’s RECLAIM Community-Based Interventions 
Cut Re-Offending Among Most Juvenile Offenders
Percent of juvenile offenders returning to custody
Note: while the data in this graph only refers to diversions from local custody, 
similar results were achieved by diverting youth from state custody. Lowenkamp & Latessa, 2005
Chapter 2
California Has Succeeded in Initial Efforts to
Fund Proven and Promising Interventions
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Several California counties are already taking
steps to prevent crime by serious offenders by
implementing tested community-based
interventions, including those described in
Chapter 1. In addition, many counties are using
state funding to support a variety of promising
interventions that attempt to prevent serious
and repeat crimes by intervening before youths
become serious or chronic offenders. The two
major sources of state funding are the Juvenile
Mentally Ill Offender Crime Reduction
program and the Juvenile Justice Crime
Prevention Act.
Juvenile Mentally Ill Offender Crime
Reduction (MIOCR) program
In 2006, California established for the first
time a Juvenile Mentally Ill Offender Crime
Reduction (MIOCR) program. The 2006-2007
budget funded Juvenile MIOCR with $22.3
million.
MIOCR funding directly supports a variety of
evidence-based programs for young offenders
with mental disorders. In fact, 13 of the 20
counties awarded Juvenile MIOCR grants were
funded to provide one of the proven intensive
family therapies—Functional Family Therapy
(FFT), Multisystemic Therapy (MST) and
Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care
(MTFC)—described in Chapter 1.24
Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act
(JJCPA)
Enacted in 2000, the Juvenile Justice Crime
Prevention Act (JJCPA) provides a dedicated
funding stream for local juvenile justice pro-
grams designed to reduce juvenile crime. These
include intensive family therapies, programs for
offenders convicted for the first time, gang and
truancy prevention, job training, after-school
programs, and diversion programs. JJCPA
currently supports 168 programs in 56
participating counties, and serves over 105,000
at-risk and delinquent youths annually.25 It is
currently funded at $119 million.
California recognizes JJCPA funding as an
integral part of a balanced anti-crime strategy.
It is linked dollar-for-dollar to the Citizens’
Option for Public Safety (COPS) program,
which funds local law enforcement agencies for
front-line public safety services.
Counties not only use JJCPA funding for
proven interventions like FFT and MST for
serious and chronic offenders,26 they also use it
“13 of the 20 counties awarded
Juvenile MIOCR grants were funded
to provide one of the proven
intensive family therapies—
Functional Family Therapy,
Multisystemic Therapy and
Multidimensional Treatment
Foster Care.”
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to intervene early to keep at-risk young people
from ever becoming serious or chronic
offenders in the first place.
Types of JJCPA programs
JJCPA’s diverse programs target youths at
different stages of involvement with the
juvenile justice system. Generally, programs
focus on one of the following stages (although
some programs may cover youths at more than
one stage):
1. Pre-arrest/prevention programs target
youths who have not yet entered, but are
at risk of entering, the juvenile justice
system.
2. Post-arrest/intervention programs serve
youths who already have been arrested.
Some of these programs divert offenders
from the traditional juvenile court, while
others provide services to youths after a
court has sentenced them to probation or
custody. Individual programs may focus
on specific levels of juvenile offenders,
ranging from first-time, low-level
offenders to serious, chronic offenders.
Most JJCPA programs are intervention
programs.
3. Post-custody/aftercare programs provide
services for youths who are transitioning
from custody back into society.
JJCPA programs often provide a range of
services, many of which may be appropriate for
youths at any stage of the juvenile justice
system. Some of the services provided by JJCPA
programs include:
• Comprehensive assessments of
individualized needs
• Mental health services, including
individual, group and family counseling
• Substance abuse treatment
• Gang prevention and intervention
• Anti-aggression training
• Employment and vocational training
• Community service activities
• Life skills training
• Academic assistance
By offering a variety of services, JJCPA
programs often can be tailored to meet the
individualized needs of participating youths.
Positive statewide outcomes for JJCPA
Because counties are required to monitor
crime-related outcomes for each JJCPA
program and to report those results back to the
state each year, JJCPA can document a strong
track record of positive outcomes that have
been fairly consistent year after year.27 In 2006,
the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation reported that:
• Youths in JJCPA programs attended
school more frequently, were suspended
and expelled less often, and had higher
GPAs than similar youths not in JJCPA
programs.
• JJCPA youths were 21 percent more
likely to complete probation and 24
percent more likely to complete court-
ordered community service.
Youths Not Served by 
Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act   
33% More Likely to Be Arrested
Percent of youths arrested
24%
32%
JJCPA youths Comparison 
youths
CA Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2006
• Finally, at-risk
youths not in JJCPA-
funded programs
were 33 percent more
likely to be arrested
and 23 percent more
likely to be
incarcerated than
participating youths.28
In light of results like
these, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s
Administration credits JJCPA with “curbing
juvenile crime”and deterring “countless
thousands”of juveniles from ending up in
custody.29
Promising new outcomes from indi-
vidual JJCPA programs
Several counties across California have
recently reported impressive results from JJCPA
programs, although generally not including
randomized control groups. For example:
• Repeat Offender Prevention
Program/“8% Solution”
The Repeat Offender Prevention Program
(ROPP), sometimes referred to as the “8%
Solution,”was originally developed in
Orange County, inspired by local
research showing that just 8 percent of
young offenders are responsible for the
majority of repeat juvenile crimes. While
FFT, MST and MTFC typically target
repeat and serious juvenile offenders,
ROPP targets young offenders early in
their criminal careers—the first time they
are convicted.30
These early offenders are screened to
determine whether they have risk factors
that indicate they are the most likely to go
on to commit more crimes. ROPP serves
offenders 15-and-a-half years of age or
younger who exhibit problems in at least
three of these four areas: school behavior
and performance problems; family
problems; substance abuse problems; or
high-risk behaviors such as stealing,
chronic running away,
or gang membership.
ROPP combines
intensive probation
supervision with a
range of services for the
youths and their
families, depending on
their needs and the
services available in
each county. For example, Orange
County’s program, known asYouth and
Family Resource Centers, provides
transportation to and from the program
each weekday, a full day of school, and a
variety of substance abuse, counseling and
family services.
In 2002, the state released an evaluation of
the program in seven counties: Fresno,
Humboldt, Los Angeles, Orange, San
Diego, San Mateo and Solano Counties.
Nearly 1,800 juveniles were randomly
assigned to either the program or a
control group in that evaluation.
Overall, ROPP produced improvements
that were statistically significant in school
attendance and performance, and in
reductions in the number of juveniles who
tested positive for drugs. Most important
for protecting communities, juvenile
offenders left out of the program were 29
percent more likely to commit felonies
than program participants. The results
were stronger in some counties than
others. For example, nearly twice as many
similar youths who did not participate in
these programs were arrested for felonies
in San Diego and Fresno Counties, and
41 percent more were arrested for felonies
in Orange County.31
While not including randomized control
groups, new data from several JJCPA-
funded ROPP programs continue to
demonstrate positive outcomes.
In Monterey County, similar youths were
twice as likely as ROPP youths to be
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“Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger’s Administration
credits JJCPA with ‘curbing
juvenile crime’ and deterring
‘countless thousands’ of juveniles
from ending up in custody”
arrested for a new crime.32
In Ventura County, similar youths were
45 percent more likely to be
incarcerated.33
And in Kern County, ROPP youths’
outcomes improved as they spent more
time in the program. Participating youths
were 33 percent less likely to be arrested
in their last six months of the program
than during their first six months.34
• Early assessments and services for
lower-risk offenders
With the help of JJCPA funds, several
California counties offer programs that
screen youths for risks and provide
services to keep them out of custody but
also away from crime. These programs are
generally less intensive than ROPP and
may target relatively low-level offenders.
Ventura County’s Early Intervention
program targets youths on “informal
probation”(arrested, but not brought
before a court) or under age 15, who are
identified as being at risk of continued
delinquency. It provides assessments and
treatment plans and focuses on increasing
family bonding, positive peer association,
good work experience, and resistance to
drugs. Compared to program participants,
similar youths who did not enroll in the
program were more than twice as likely to
be arrested and more than eight times
more likely to be incarcerated.35
Shasta County’s Juvenile Assessment
Center targets first-time misdemeanor
offenders. A probation officer conducts an
assessment of each offender and works
with the family to identify needs and
appropriate referrals. Compared to over
400 juvenile offenders who were assessed,
similar youths not in this program were
twice as likely to be arrested.36
• Day Reporting Centers
Several counties utilize JJCPA funding for
Day Reporting Centers, which may serve
youths sentenced to probation and/or
youths transitioning from county custody
at a camp or ranch back into their
communities. Day Reporting Centers
generally provide a range of
comprehensive services that can include
not only activities and services after
school, but also an on-site school for
youths who have not done well in a
16 FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS California
Monterey County’s 
Repeat Offender Prevention Program 
Cut Arrests by More than Half
Percent of youths arrested for a new crime
27%
66%
ROPP youths Comparison 
youths
Monterey County Probation Dept., 2006
Ventura County’s 
Early Intervention Program 
Cut Incarceration Dramatically
Percent of youths incarcerated
2%
17%
Participating 
youths
Comparison 
youths
Ventura County Probation Dept., 2006
regular school setting.
Sacramento County’s Day Reporting
Center collected data showing that,
compared to program participants,
juveniles in a similar group not receiving
services were four times more likely to
have a felony arrest.37
Monterey County’s Silver Star
Day/Rancho Cielo program found that
youths not in the program were twice as
likely as participating youths to be
arrested for a new crime.38
Ventura County’s Aftercare Day
Reporting Center cut the number of
incarcerated youths by more than half.39
• Coordinated custodial/aftercare
services
Some JJCPA programs provide a
continuity of services during and following
custody in order to prepare offenders for,
and ease, their transition back into their
communities.
Santa Barbara County’s Aftercare
Services Program begins when a juvenile
offender enters into custody. Probation
officers meet with juveniles and their
families to outline behavioral and
academic expectations and plans for free-
time programming. Approximately four
weeks prior to a juvenile’s release from
custody, the probation officer and aftercare
staff begin to establish aftercare plans,
which the aftercare staff then monitors.
The program cut the number of arrests for
participating juveniles nearly in half,
relative to a similar group.40
Orange County’s Sobriety Through
Education and Prevention (STEP)
program serves girls in court-ordered
commitment. It offers assessment and
treatment services for both mental health
and substance abuse, along with
individualized academic plans, gender-
specific programming (including job-
shadowing and women’s issues discussion
groups), and intensive aftercare
supervision. Girls left out of the program
were 72 percent more likely to be arrested
than program participants.41
• Drug treatment
Research shows that drug dependence
should be treated as a chronic problem,
where relapses are, unfortunately, com-
mon. Many JJCPA programs focus on drug
treatment, with promising results. JJCPA
funds, for example, several drug courts,
which generally provide regular drug
testing, court appearances and counseling,
as well as intensive supervision. While a
meta-analysis of research on juvenile and
adult drug courts showed that the adult
courts produced more positive out-
comes,42 data collected for a number of
California’s juvenile drug courts are
showing strong results.
In Orange County, similar youths were
70 percent more likely to be incarcerated
than drug court participants.
In Monterey County, similar youths were
nearly four times more likely to be
arrested for a new crime.43
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Youths Left Out of 
Sacramento County’s Day Reporting Center 
Four Times More Likely to Commit Felony
Percent of youths arrested for a felony
6%
24%
Participating 
youths
Comparison 
youths
Sacramento County Probation Dept., 2006
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• Gang prevention
Sonoma County’s Gang Risk
Intervention and Suppression program
serves youths affiliated with and/or
actively involved in gang activity. In
addition to being closely supervised,
youths participate in weekly group
sessions for 12 to 24 weeks, where they
learn about gang culture and risks,
alternative choices and behaviors, and
tools to become positive contributing
members of the community. A Family
Advocate works directly with parents
and/or caregivers to identify needs and
obtain resources in each community.
Youths left out of this JJCPA-funded
program were more than twice as likely to
be arrested as program participants.44
• Anti-truancy programs
Anti-truancy programs target youths who
are chronically absent from school. While
many truants may not have been arrested,
truancy is an important risk factor for
future crime.45 These programs can
include comprehensive services for truant
youths, and some include potential
prosecution of youths and their families to
ensure that the families take regular
school attendance seriously.
San Diego County’s Truancy Supervision
Program, for example, recently reported
that youths not participating in this
JJCPA-funded program were more than
three times as likely to be arrested as
program participants.46
Thanks to funding from MIOCR and JJCPA,
which is often matched with other federal,
state and local funding, counties across
California offer proven and promising
interventions to protect the public from repeat
offenders.Yet increased investments in
interventions are still sorely needed.
Truants Left Out of 
San Diego County’s Anti-Truancy Program 
More than Three Times as Likely 
to Get Arrested
Percent of youths arrested
5.3%
18%
Participating 
youths
Comparison 
youths
San Diego Association of Governments, 2006
Despite the fact that many community-based
interventions for at-risk youths and juvenile
offenders have proven to be successful at
preventing crime, not nearly enough youths are
being served through these programs. For
example, intensive family therapies serve very
few youths statewide, and the demand for
funding for juvenile interventions through the
Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act (JJCPA)
and the Juvenile Mentally Ill Offender Crime
Reduction (MIOCR) program is considerably
higher than available funding. Furthermore,
JJCPA’s volatile funding history has led many
counties to abandon or scale back programs,
leaving youths without the critical services they
need to help steer them away from crime.
Intensive family therapies serve only
a small fraction of eligible youths
According to new data released in April 2007,
on any given day, there are more than 20,000
juvenile offenders in California who are
obvious candidates to receive Functional
Family Therapy (FFT), Multisystemic Therapy
(MST) or Multidimensional Treatment Foster
Care (MTFC). These juveniles are either at
home under intensive supervision (as opposed
to regular probation), in foster care or group
homes, or in aftercare following custody.47
Placing these juveniles in one of these three
proven intensive family therapies would
drastically cut future crime.
Yet these intensive family therapies serve just
a small number of these juveniles and their
families. On any given day, these programs
serve fewer than 900 total juvenile offenders
statewide. Functional Family Therapy (FFT)
serves 601 juvenile offenders, Multisystemic
Therapy (MST) serves 217, and
Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care
(MTFC) serves just 16.48
California, therefore, is serving only
approximately 4 percent—one in 25—of
juvenile offenders who could benefit from
these programs. And this does not even include
Chapter 3
Many California Juvenile Offenders Still Are
Not Receiving Needed Interventions
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Only 4% of 
Eligible Juvenile Offenders Served by 
Proven Intensive Family Therapies
Number of juvenile offenders placed at 
home or in community
834
juveniles 
served
Juvenile Justice Data Project; California Institute for 
Mental Health; County probation depts., 2007
20,233
eligible and not 
served
many of the more than 10,000 youths held in
county detention facilities, camps or ranches,49
for whom placement in one of these proven
programs might more effectively cut their
involvement in future crime.50
It appears from this data that these proven
intensive family therapies could serve 25 times
more juvenile offenders than they currently
serve and still not reach all those they should
be serving.
County-by-county data on the number of
juvenile offenders served by each of the
intensive family therapies and the number of
juvenile offenders eligible for these programs
are in Appendix A.
High demand for interventions for
juvenile offenders
Demand for interventions for juvenile
offenders far outpaces the supply of available
funding. For example, the Juvenile MIOCR
program, which most grantees are using to
fund intensive family therapies, had a highly
competitive grant process in 2006. Demand
was 60 percent higher than available funding,
and the state rejected $14 million in
applications due to lack of funding,51 including
several applications that would have funded
Functional Family Therapy or Multisystemic
Therapy.52
The demand for Juvenile Justice Crime
Prevention Act (JJCPA) funding is more difficult
to measure because virtually every county relies
on a consensus process for JJCPA funding,
rather than competitive applications. A local
coordinating council in each county generally
decides how to distribute JJCPA funds based on
its assessment of service gaps and where the
greatest need lies in the community. As a
result, there is no statewide data comparable to
MIOCR showing the extent of demand for
JJCPA funding.
San Francisco, however, does conduct a
competitive application process, in which
community organizations apply to receive
JJCPA funding. And if San Francisco’s
experience is any indication, demand for JJCPA
funding is quite high. In 2006, $4.9 million in
funding was requested, but only $2.4 million
was available.53 As a result, half of the funding
requested had to be turned down.
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Demand for 
Juvenile Mentally Ill Offender 
Crime Reduction Program 
60% Higher than Available Funding
Grant funding in 2006
$36.6 million
$22.3 million
Funding 
requested
Grants 
awarded
CA Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2006
Half of JJCPA Funding Requested 
in San Francisco Turned Away, Due to 
Lack of Funding
Grant funding in 2006
$4.9 million
$2.4 million
Funding 
requested
Grants 
awarded
San Francisco Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice, 2006
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State JJCPA funding still below
original funding level
JJCPA funding is not only inadequate, it also
has been unstable. Given repeated proposed
and actual cuts, county officials are often in
doubt over whether they will have enough
money to continue their programs. Originally
funded at $121 million in
2000-2001, JJCPA funding
fell to $100 million.
Even after the recent
budget restored $19 million
to raise funding to $119
million, JJCPA is still funded
below its original funding
level—without even taking
into account the increased
cost of living and increases
in salaries for probation officers and others
who staff JJCPA programs. Just to restore JJCPA
to its true 2000-2001 level, so that it could buy
the same level of services, would require a
boost to close to $150 million.54
JJCPA’s decline in funding is particularly
striking, given overall increases in state
spending during the life of JJCPA. Since 2000-
2001, not only has the cost of living increased
by 20 percent, K-12 funding has increased by
35 percent, and adult and youth Corrections
funding has soared by 77 percent.55Yet in the
same time frame, JJCPA funding has fallen 2
percent.
By shortchanging JJCPA despite its strong
track record, California is failing to fully pursue
the balanced crime-fighting strategy that public
safety requires.
Local impact of JJCPA
funding cuts
As a result of state-level
cuts, counties have been
forced to eliminate many
JJCPA programs altogether
or scale them back
significantly.56 While the
recent funding increase
may restore some of these programs, it is still
not enough to fully repair the damage from
past cuts.
To get a more in-depth understanding of the
impact of JJCPA funding cuts on counties,
FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS contacted over 20
county probation departments, primarily from
California’s largest counties, in order to identify
where they had to cut back, as well as what
interventions and services they would provide
if more funding were available.
JJCPA Funding Lags Far Behind Other State Spending, Still Below Original Level 
Percent increase since 2000
20%
77%
Cost of Living
K-12
Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2002 and 2007; California Consumer Price Index
Adult and Youth 
Corrections
JJCPA
35%
-2%
“By shortchanging JJCPA
despite its strong track
record, California is failing to
fully pursue the balanced
crime-fighting strategy that
public safety requires.”
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Below are some powerful examples of how
the reduction in JJCPA funding has impacted
counties, juvenile offenders and public safety
across the state:
• Valuable JJCPA programs have been
eliminated
Sacramento County, for example,
eliminated JJCPA funding for five
programs, even though it reports that all
five programs were producing good
outcomes.57
San Diego County put its Repeat
Offender Prevention Program on hold—
despite its success in cutting felony arrests
nearly in half—following cuts to JJCPA
funding in 2003-2004.58
• Other JJCPA programs serve fewer
youths or offer reduced services
Some program cutbacks were directly tied
to the fact that the cost of living (and thus,
the cost of paying staff and probation
officers’ salaries) has increased, while
funding for JJCPA has not.
Orange County had to cut four of its six
Youth and Family Resource Centers, even
though this pioneer 8% solution/Repeat
Offender Prevention Program had been
found to reduce felonies significantly.59
While one of the four shut-down sites is
reopening with county funding in 2007,
the others are still closed. As a result, the
county does not have the capacity it needs
to serve all eligible juvenile offenders:
Over 20 juveniles each month are denied
access because of the lack of programs in
their local communities.60
San Joaquin County’s Crossroads
program has experienced a 60 percent
decline in the number of youths it serves
due to funding cuts, resulting in nearly
700 fewer youths being served. Crossroads
is a prevention program that targets “out
of control” youths who have not yet been
adjudicated as delinquent. It provides
counseling and other direct services, as
well as referrals for participating youths
and their families.61
San Luis Obispo County has scaled back
its Intensive Community Diversion
Program, in part due to budget cuts and
lack of a cost-of-living adjustment. It cut
back the number of sites and also had to
cut many on-site services, such as free
drug and alcohol treatment. The county
now refers youths to treatment programs
that their families may not be able to
afford, and which may have waiting lists.
This diversion program provides
community-based services as an
alternative to court-ordered services for
some young offenders. Although this
program has suffered cutbacks, the county
has somewhat compensated for the
decline in funds thanks to its increasing
experience in operating the program.62
• Countywide expansion plans are
being sidelined, leaving many youth
unserved
Fresno County, for example, provides an
after-school prevention program inspired
by the “8% solution.” This JJCPA-funded
program, Students Targeted with
San Joaquin County 
Forced to Cut 700 Kids from 
Crossroads Prevention Program
Number of youths served
1,100
429
Youths served  
in a prior year
Youths served 
in 2005-2006
San Joaquin County Probation Dept., 2007
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Opportunities for Prevention (STOP),
provides a wide range of services to
youths ages 10 to 14 years who are
assessed as at risk of entering the juvenile
justice system. The county hopes to
expand its STOP program to reach all
middle schools in the county and serve
four times as many youths (a total of
2,000), but funding is not available.63
• Youths are on waiting lists for vital
services
Several JJCPA-funded Day Reporting
Centers have been unable to deliver
timely services, which is especially
detrimental because Day Reporting
Centers often provide critical, time-
sensitive services to help youths transition
from custody back into their communities.
Many youths wait to enter or are turned
away from Sacramento County’s Day
Reporting Center;64 youths in San Diego
County must wait several weeks before
getting into the Day Reporting Center;65
Solano County’s Day Reporting Center
has a waiting list;66 and Ventura County’s
Aftercare Day Reporting Center is in need
of additional therapists, resulting in
youths waiting up to three weeks to
receive therapy.67
• Parents—who are crucial for keeping
kids out of trouble—are being ignored
Orange County’s Probation Department
conducted an assessment of the unmet
needs among juvenile offenders and
highlighted the need for more parental
involvement.68
Solano County’s Day Reporting Center
had to cut several case manager positions,
resulting in decreased family involvement
because there were not enough staff
members to encourage families to
participate.69
• Specific services that are needed,
including gang-prevention, aftercare
and gender-specific programs for girls,
Jessica,Ventura County
When Jessica was growing up, her dad was addicted to drugs. Though her dad was at
home, she says he was “not in the right state of mind.” Jessica’s mom worked in the
evenings as a nurse so Jessica took on many of the responsibilities for raising her four
siblings at a young age. But she also “acted out”and “was in fight after fight.”
After committing a residential burglary at the age of 15, Jessica entered the Repeat
Offender Prevention Program (ROPP). “I didn’t plan on going to jail. I mean, I was a
cheerleader … received straight As, was on Honor Roll.” In ROPP, she participated in
various activites, including individual and family counseling, and teen empowerment and
victim impact classes.
Jessica says ROPP gave her the chance to turn her life around. In 2005, Jessica
graduated from high school with honors. The program even had a positive impact on her
father. After attending family counseling through the ROPP program and observing
Jessica’s successes, her father decided to seek help for his addiction. Today, Jessica has a
“great relationship”with her dad, who has been “clean” for three years. Jessica, now 20
years old, is married and has a son. She works as a teller at Wells Fargo Bank and attends
classes at Santa Barbara Business College, where she is earning a paralegal certificate.
Jessica explains,“The law is fun if you’re on the right side of it.”
Success Story
are often not receiving funding
Many counties are interested in doing
more to address gangs, improve aftercare
services, or establish programs tailored for
girls with JJCPA funding, but those plans
are on hold without additional funding
(see endnote for specific examples).70
California can and needs to do far more to
meet the increasing need for effective
community-based interventions to steer youth
away from crime. Failing to provide these
interventions to juvenile offenders who need
them not only increases crime, it also costs
taxpayers money.
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Larry Seta, Monterey County
When Larry reached his teenage years, he says he “started messing up”—he smoked
marijuana heavily and never listened to his parents. He frequently got arrested and sent to
juvenile hall, primarily due to using drugs and driving without a license.
When Larry first heard about Rancho Cielo (Montery County’s Silver Star Day
Reporting Center), he was hesitant to go. However, once in the program, he enjoyed it so
much that he participated for two-and-a-half years, despite the fact that his probation
requirements mandated less. At Rancho Cielo, Larry learned how to control his anger and
to think before acting. He also participated in various activities like basketball, fishing and
golf. Larry said he liked “everything”about the program.
The staff at Rancho Cielo helped Larry get a job working for Salinas Steel Builders.
Larry, now 18 years old, has been saving money in order to start his own business and
aspires to one day build houses. He no longer uses drugs because he doesn’t “want
anything to jeopardize my job.” He points out that Rancho Cielo “taught me how to
grow up.”
Success Story
The average cost of placing a juvenile
offender in state custody for a year following
trial is substantial, approximately $175,000 per
youth.71 By contrast, the typical one year’s
tuition at a California State University is about
$3,200 a year.72
Naturally, compared to the price of locking
up juveniles, it is a lot less expensive for youths
to stay at home and receive services for
themselves and their families. For example,
Multisystemic Therapy (MST) costs $4,264 per
youth, while Functional Family Therapy (FFT)
costs just $2,325 per youth.73
But cheaper is not necessarily more effective.
The real test of whether interventions produce
long-term savings—or actually end up costing
society more—will be whether they
successfully reduce repeat crimes. Each high-
risk juvenile prevented from adopting a life of
crime could save the country between $1.7
million and $2.3 million.74
Intensive family therapies save from
$18,000 to $75,000 per offender—and
could save California over $700
million
Research confirms that interventions like
intensive family therapies are not only
relatively inexpensive compared to custody,
they are also cost-effective because they are
better at reducing future crime. Steve Aos and
his team at the Washington State Institute for
Public Policy confirmed that impressive savings
are possible with their October 2006 review of
more than 571 interventions. Typically, the
studies Aos and his team looked at compared
the new intervention with the services youth
would regularly receive. Out of that
comprehensive review of what works, they
produced a cost-benefit analysis. Many
interventions tested did not produce reductions
in repeat crimes or savings, and a few, such as
Scared Straight, made things worse. Far too
often, good intentions were not enough. But
Aos and his team found that some well-tested
interventions delivered very strong results.
For example, every dollar invested in FFT
resulted in more than $14 in savings to
taxpayers and crime victims; every dollar
invested in Multidimensional Treatment Foster
Care (MTFC) resulted in $12 in savings; and
every dollar invested in MST resulted in $5 in
savings.75 These figures only include savings
from crime reduction, and they do not even
take into account savings from lower welfare
costs or increased income tax receipts from
troubled teens who turn their lives around and
become productive adults.
These proven interventions reduce repeat
crimes so much that they produce net savings
(after subtracting the cost of the intervention)
of $18,000 to over $75,000 for each juvenile
offender served.76
While it would cost approximately $85
million to provide these intensive family
therapies to all of the more than 20,000
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Chapter 4
Cutting Crime Saves Money
unserved juvenile offenders in California who
are obvious candidates for these programs,
such an investment could save taxpayers and
crime victims, after subtracting costs, over $700
million.78 County-by-county projections of
potential savings are provided in Appendix A.
Not only is
investment in these
interventions
imperative from a
public safety
perspective, there is
also a fiscal imperative
to avoid future costs to
taxpayers by investing
wisely in these
programs.
Other interventions
also save money
Promising
interventions like many of those funded by the
Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act are likely
to pay off in significant cost savings, even if
they do not match the savings demonstrated by
rigorously-tested, proven programs. For
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Community-Based Interventions that Reduce Crime Also Save Money
Savings to
taxpayers
and victims
Program 
costs
Net savings
to taxpayers 
and victims
(subtracting cost 
of program)
Functional Family Therapy 
(FFT)
Multisystemic Therapy 
(MST)
Multidimensional Treatment Foster 
Care (MTFC)77
$22,477 
$34,146
$84,743
$4,264
$2,325
$6,945
$18,213 
$31,821 
$77,798
 
Washington State Institute for Public Policy, 2006
Proven intervention
Reducing pretrial detention saves money
One way that several JJCPA programs may save money is by safely redirecting young
offenders who are not a serious threat to their communities away from detention prior to
trial, and in its place, providing less costly supervision.
Santa Cruz County is one of four national model sites for over 75 jurisdictions
nationwide that are part of the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI), a project of
the Annie E. Casey Foundation.81 The county is experiencing a 95 percent success rate with
home supervision and a 98 percent success rate with electronic monitoring in terms of
offenders who show up for trial without having been arrested for any new crimes. Time
spent in detention is down: The average length of stay in Santa Cruz County’s juvenile hall
is now fewer than nine days, compared to a state average of 27 days.82 This new approach
did not result in increased crime; in fact, from 1997 to 2005, juvenile felony arrests in the
county fell 48 percent and were declining at a much faster rate than statewide.83
According to Santa Cruz County Probation officials, the Juvenile Justice Crime
Prevention Act has “boosted”its JDAI efforts.84 For example, the JJCPA-funded Evening
Center provides supervision and structure after school and on Saturdays to youths referred
by the Juvenile Court in order to avoid detention and/or out-of-home placement.Youths
generally participate for between 12 and 30 days. The program is used both pre-
disposition (prior to trial) and as a post-disposition alternative for youths already on
probation.
Savings from reduced pretrial detention can free up juvenile justice resources for proven
interventions with the more serious and repeat offenders who are at greater risk of
becoming career criminals.
example, Ohio’s statewide commitment to
community-based interventions translated into
substantial savings, even though those
interventions did not include intensive family
therapies such as MST, FFT and MTFC. By
reassigning moderate-risk juvenile offenders to
community sanctions with strict interventions,
Ohio’s RECLAIM effort saved not only an
average of $28,000 in juvenile custody costs per
youth, it also produced an average of $19,000
in reduced crime savings. Total savings
averaged $47,000 per moderate-risk juvenile
redirected to community-based interventions.79
No doubt California’s Juvenile Justice Crime
Prevention Act also is yielding significant
savings, given the promising crime-prevention
outcomes reported and the Governor’s
conclusion that it is keeping “countless
thousands”from being locked up.80
The bottom line: Effective community-based
interventions for troubled youth protect our
communities while saving taxpayers money.
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Jessie, Santa Cruz County
Jessie, age 17, was born in Mexico, and moved to California when he was a baby. He
enjoyed middle school, but high school was different because his classmates started
getting involved in gangs and drugs.
Jessie was referred to the JJCPA-funded Evening Center after getting into a fight and
bringing a knife to school. He says,“At first I hated it … and thought it was boring.…
Then I stopped going high. [I] started playing games … talking to staff. I just enjoyed it.
[The center] kind of helps you stay out of trouble.” Jessie did community service, partici-
pated in workshops on drugs and gangs, and spoke highly of group meetings, where he
learned about “making positive choices.” His favorite aspect of the center was meditation
at the start of each day, which helped him “get into a good state of mind.”
Jessie’s behavior changed. He stopped being violent and getting high, explaining,
“Slowly, I started thinking differently, and making wiser choices, too.” In terms of his
relationship with his parents, Jessie notes, “I don’t scream…. Now [I] talk.”
Jessie continues to attend the center, even though he already successfully graduated
from the program. He recently gave a presentation to youth there on the dangers of
tobacco. He points out,“It’s fun … a great environment.…You meet people … and the
food’s pretty good, too.” Jessie will graduate high school this June, and wants to go to
college to study forensics.
Success Story
The more than 350 members of FIGHT CRIME:
INVEST IN KIDS California support investing in
proven and promising community-based
interventions to steer youth away from crime.
In order to build on California’s successes, we
call on California policymakers to:
• Protect and increase funding for the
Juvenile Mentally Ill Offender Crime
Reduction program and the Juvenile
Justice Crime Prevention Act to
support a range of proven and
promising interventions. These
interventions include intensive family
therapies for many juvenile offenders who
are becoming increasingly involved in
crime but do not yet need to be locked up,
some offenders facing custody who can
safely remain in their communities, and
other offenders who are leaving custody
and need help transitioning back into
their communities.
• If California moves forward with
reform efforts to shift many juvenile
offenders from state to county custody,
encourage the use of proven and
promising community-based
interventions, where appropriate, out
of state savings redirected to the
counties.
• Encourage the use of scientifically-
valid risk assessments to identify the
appropriate interventions for juvenile
offenders.
• Encourage the use of proven
intensive family therapies by
supporting training for providers and
monitoring program implementation to
ensure there is strict adherence to the
program models.
• Continue to systematically collect
and use juvenile arrest data to hold
programs accountable for successfully
reducing crime.
The members of FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS
California are committed to supporting
community-based interventions to steer young
offenders away from crime, because they know
that effective interventions will produce both
huge savings and safer communities.
Chapter 5
Recommendations from the Front Lines
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Appendix A:
County-by-County Analysis of
EligibleYouths Served by Intensive Family Therapies
and Potential Savings if All Served
Chart continued on page 30.
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Alameda
Alpine
Amador
Butte
Calaveras
Colusa
Contra Costa
Del Norte
El Dorado
Fresno
Glenn
Humboldt
Imperial
Inyo
Kern
Kings
Lake
Lassen
Los Angeles
Madera
Marin
Mariposa
Mendocino
Merced
Modoc
Mono
Monterey
Napa
Nevada
Juvenile Offenders Served by Intensive
Family TherapiesCounty
FFT MST MTFC Total
Eligible
Juveniles
Percent 
Served
Potential
Savings
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
11
20*
-
45*
-
-
23
-
-
-
220*
-
30*
-
-
20*
-
-
15*
-
-
30
-
-
-
-
-
30*
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
41
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
3*
-
-
12
-
-
-
-
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
30
-
-
-
-
-
33
-
11
32
-
45
-
-
24
-
-
-
261
-
30
-
-
20
-
-
15
-
-
477
-
5
n/a
32
24
294
70
22
413
108
122
25
8
769
694
118
39
5,897
103
62
9
107
236
14
19
157
188
n/a
6%
-
-
-
-
-
11%
-
50%
8%
-
37%
-
-
3%
-
-
-
4%
-
48%
-
-
8%
-
-
10%
-
-
$23,948,600 
-
$389,000 
-
$1,170,000 
$917,100 
$12,064,400 
$2,279,000 
$464,200 
$15,887,500 
$2,807,400 
$3,203,600 
$1,945,000 
$569,600 
$30,093,000 
$18,206,300 
$4,007,600 
$2,348,000 
$211,560,100 
$3,737,900 
$1,704,800
$489,100 
$3,943,600 
$6,164,900 
$614,100 
$633,700 
$5,456,000 
$6,233,800 
 - 
* The estimate of juvenile offenders served in these counties includes juveniles projected to be served through Mentally Ill Offender Crime Reduction
(MIOCR) grants awarded in late 2006.
For the number of eligible offenders, see Hennigan, K., Kolnick, K., Poplawski, J., Andrews, A., Ball, N., Cheng, C. & Payne, J. (2007). Juvenile Justice Data
Project Phase 1: Survey of Interventions and Programs: A Continuum of Graduated Responses for Juvenile Justice in California. County by County
Appendix. Los Angeles, CA: University of Southern California, Center for Research on Crime. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ReportsResearch/docs/JJDPSurveyFinalReportCountybyCountyAppendix.pdf
Eligible offenders are based on a one-day snapshot that includes juvenile offenders either under intensive supervision (rather than regular probation), in a
group home or foster home, or in aftercare following custody. Eight of California’s 58 counties did not provide the relevant data.
For estimates of the number of offenders served by Functional Family Therapy (FFT), Multisystemic Therapy (MST) and Multidimensional Treatment Foster
Care (MTFC), the primary sources were: Personal communication with Todd Sosna. (2007, March 24). Todd Sosna is a Senior Associate at the California
Institute for Mental Health; Personal communication with Keller Strother. (2007, February 27). Keller Strother is President of MST Services. Many coordina-
tors of these programs in various counties were also contacted to verify exact numbers served. Consistent with the eligible offender data, the numbers
served are also from a one-day snapshot, rather than the annual total number of youth served. These estimates do not include at-risk youth not on proba-
tion who also are served by many of these programs. These figures may overestimate the number of offenders being served because they include the num-
ber of juvenile offenders that new Mentally Ill Offender Crime Reduction grantees expect to serve in 2007 using these models, although many of these
programs are not yet operational and are not yet officially recognized by the national organizations that developed the models (which would help ensure
the fidelity to the program models that is crucial for ensuring positive outcomes).
For potential savings, the estimates are based on: Aos, S., Miller, M. & Drake, E. (2006). Evidence-based public policy options to reduce future prison con-
struction, criminal justice costs, and crime rates. Olympia, WA: Washington State Institute for Public Policy. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/
The projected savings are based on the assumption that all of the juvenile offenders in group or foster homes would receive MTFC, and the juvenile
offenders under intensive supervision and in aftercare/released from county custody would be assigned to FFT and MST in roughly equal numbers. The
potential savings are net savings (after subtracting the approximately $81 million cost of the programs) and do not include any costs or savings related to
offenders already being served by these intensive family therapies.
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Orange
Placer
Plumas
Riverside
Sacramento
San Benito
San Bernardino
San Diego
San Francisco
San Joaquin
San Luis Obispo
San Mateo
Santa Barbara
Santa Clara
Santa Cruz
Shasta
Sierra
Siskiyou
Solano
Sonoma
Stanislaus
Sutter/Yuba
Tehama
Trinity
Tulare
Tuolumne
Ventura
Yolo
Total
Juvenile Offenders Served by Intensive
Family TherapiesCounty
FFT MST MTFC Total
Eligible
Juveniles
Percent 
Served
Potential
Savings
-
20
-
-
29
-
30*
-
-
-
-
50
-
-
-
-
-
-
23*
-
-
35
-
-
-
-
-
30*
601
-
-
-
-
25*
-
-
36*
30
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
25*
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
217
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
16
-
20
-
-
54
-
30
36
30
-
-
50
-
-
-
-
-
-
23
25
-
35
-
-
-
-
-
30
834
2,437
221
n/a
n/a
817
40
2,078
1,083
203
228
66
684
496
362
207
196
5
32
203
n/a
302
101
n/a
81
n/a
n/a
599
614
21,067
-
9%
-
-
7%
-
1%
3%
15%
-
-
7%
-
-
-
-
-
-
11%
-
-
35%
-
-
-
-
-
5%
4%
$65,294,500 
$6,106,300
-
-
$34,367,200 
$1,211,800 
$65,281,600 
$36,571,700 
$8,385,100 
$10,876,400 
$3,076,200 
$18,898,600 
$15,733,600 
$12,539,700 
$5,811,900 
$5,747,800
$389,000 
$1,433,900 
$5,666,100 
-
$9,349,700 
$1,993,600 
-
$2,395,800 
-
-
$17,888,100 
$18,945,000 
$708,801,900 
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